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Reversing the Tide of Aid: Investigating
Development Policy Sovereignty in the Pacific
by
John OVERTON*, Gerard PRINSEN** , Warwick E. MURRAY* and
Nicki WRIGHTON*
ABSTRACT
Since the early 2000s, international development co-
operation principles emphasise recipient countries’
ownership of policies, donors’ alignment with the reci-
pients’ administrative processes, and harmonisation
of donor processes. Overall, this should enhance the
development policy sovereignty in the Pacific Island
countries and polities. Since 2011 researchers from
Victoria University, Massey University, the University
of the South Pacific, and the University of New Caledo-
nia have investigated the impact of changing aid moda-
lities on development policy sovereignty in the Pacific.
The research includes a range of polities: independent
states, semi-autonomous territories, as well as dependent
territories.Firstfindingssuggestaidpolicies inthePacific
unfold in unique ways and ‘aid’ is just one of the flows of
resources between Pacific Islands and post-colonial
powers. Moreover, the relationship between aid and
sovereignty is more than one of donor and recipient; it
also contains elements of, and space for, agency by
Pacific peoples.
K: Pacific, aid policies, sovereignty, local
agency, comparative research
RÉSUMÉ
Depuis les années 2000, les principes de coopération
internationale veulent que les pays bénéficiaires d’aides
définissent eux-même leurs politiques de développe-
ment, afin de renforcer la souveraineté des entités poli-
tiques du Pacifique dans cette formulation, et que les
bailleurs de fonds, développant une approche concertée,
s’alignent sur les procédures administratives locales.
Depuis 2011, des chercheurs de l’Université Victoria, de
l’Université Massey, de l’Université du Pacifique Sud et
de l’Université de la Nouvelle-Calédonie s’intéressent
aux conséquences de ce changement des modalités de
l’aide sur la souveraineté des États du Pacifique en
matière de politiques de développement, grâce à la sélec-
tion d’un éventail varié d’entités politiques : États indé-
pendants, territoires semi-autonomes et territoires
dépendants. Les premiers résultats suggèrent que les
politiques d’aide dans le Pacifique se déploient selon des
modalités uniques, l’aide ne constituant qu’un aspect des
flux de ressources entre États insulaires et puissances
postcoloniales. Trop complexes pour se résumer à la rela-
tion bailleur de fonds-pays bénéficiaire, les liens entre
aide et souveraineté offrent un cadre où les habitants du
Pacifique expriment une capacité d’action autonome.
M- : Pacifique, politique d’aide, souveraineté,
adaptation locale, recherche comparée
The region of Oceania presents an interesting
arena for the study of international development
aid. Countries in the region are amongst the
highest per capita recipients of aid in the world,
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though these figures are highly variable within
the region and the aggregate volume of aid to the
region is very small on the global scale. When we
analyse the phenomenon of aid in Oceania com-
plex issues emerge that have implications for our
understanding of development assistance more
generally, relating, for example, to the definition
of aid, the relationship between sovereignty and
aid and the importance of local agency in the
global aid landscape. Overall, comparative
research in Oceania provides the opportunity to
glean a systematic insight into the diversity of
ways that the global aid agenda of the 2000s has
influenced outcomes at national, regional and
local scales.
This paper begins with an overview of the
international aid agenda of the past decade and
the manifestations of this in Oceania. It then
moves to analyse two key aspects of aid in the
Pacific: firstly, the diversity of aid regimes as well
as debates concerning the definition of aid, and
secondly the contentious and complex issue of
sovereignty as it relates to aid. A current research
project on aid in the Pacific is then outlined
before some conclusions are drawn commenting
in particular on the need to reimagine aid,
agency and autonomy.
Context: The global aid regime and the Pacific
region
Since the adoption in 1999 of the Millennium
Development Goals (s), backed by the
United Nations, development aid has been
transformed at the global scale. The s them-
selves not only helped serve as a catalyst for
donor countries to increase their aid budgets but
were also particularly influential in focusing aid
on poverty alleviation and providing targets
against which the performance of aid could
begin to be measured. Through the first decade
of the 2000s, development aid (as measured by
the Development Assistance Committee []
of the ) grew significantly in both volume
and as a percentage of donor countries’ national
income. This trend was also affected by the after-
math of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in  and rela-
ted incidents in Europe and Southeast Asia.
Western governments were greatly concerned
that politically unstable and economically poor
countries could become a haven for terrorist
groups and they used aid as a key instrument in
helping to support and build the functional
capacity of ‘fragile’ states particularly in terms of
delivering basic welfare services and law and
order (Barbara, 2006). It was a move towards the
‘securitization’ of aid (Howell and Lind, 2008 ;
Shannon, 2009). These shifts marked a depar-
ture from the early aid regimes of ‘pure’ neo-
liberalism in the late 1980s and 1990s, which had
sought to promote market-led development
strategies and lessen the role of the state, and
could be characterised as ‘neostructural’ in
character (Murray and Overton, 2011a, 2011b).
A further key international agreement that
influenced global development aid in the 2000s
was the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
of 2005. This agreement, brokered by the 
and signed by the major donors ¢ as well as many
recipient governments ¢ sought to improve the
effectiveness of aid. Having agreed to an increase
in aid budgets, donors sought to ensure that
the aid they were granting reached the intended
recipients. In this sense, the Paris Declaration
was arguably more concerned with the efficiency
of aid delivery than the effectiveness of the
spending in terms of development outcomes, as
defined by the s. Nonetheless, the Paris
Declaration marked a significant and potentially
revolutionary change in the way aid was
conceived and delivered and it represented a
remarkable consensus amongst most of the aid
community. The Declaration was built around
five core principles: ownership, alignment,
harmonisation, mutual accountability and
management for results. The first of these ¢
ownership ¢ was pivotal. It recognised and
encouraged the ‘ownership’ of development
strategies ¢ and by implication the financial
resources that flowed from aid receipts - by
recipient countries. It asked these countries ¢
and their governments ¢ to prepare strategic
plans to address poverty reduction and, if accep-
table, these formed the basis for long-term and
sustained commitment by donors to align with
these plans, harmonise their efforts (to avoid
donor duplication and competition) and fund
substantial development programs in areas such
as health and education (Eyben, 2007). The Paris
Declaration further underlined the neostructu-
ral turn by recognising the state ¢ rather than
civil society or the market ¢ as the key agency for
development. ‘Ownership’ was thus predicated
on the state ¢ a sovereign state that putatively
defined and led ‘development’ (Williams, 2000;
Buiter, 2007).
Overall then this new aid regime involved a
strong rhetorical approach that supported and
built state sovereignty. Furthermore, this
rhetoric was underpinned by changes in aid
modalities. These again moved the aid regime
away from the old aid modality of discrete
aid projects managed by donors towards
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programmes of financial support to public
policies implemented by public administrations
of sovereign states. This donor support to
sovereign states, however, was conditional upon
approval of the recipients’ public policies such
as Poverty Reduction Strategies (s) (Booth,
2003; Cheru, 2006; Dijkstra and Komives, 2011;
Driscoll and Evans, 2005; Sumner, 2006)
and changes to a countries’ public finance mana-
gement systems audited internationally via
mechanisms such as Public Expenditure and
Financial Accountability () frameworks
(Eifert and Gelb, 2008; De Renzio, 2006, 2009).
In essence the new aid regime draws a strong line
between aid and good governance: aid and aid
conditionalities are used as tools to improve the
efficiency, transparency and productivity of
government institutions (Santiso and Nitze,
2001). Yet this is, to a large extent an exercise
in rebuilding state institutions and practices in
recipient countries so they more closely match
those of donors (Murray and Overton, 2011a).
Acknowledging that most aid recipient states
would not immediately meet the expectations of
donors with regard to policies and public finance
management, donors developed a set of inter-
linked aid modalities that envisaged increasing
volumes of aid and decision-making powers by
the recipients as these recipients improved their
institutional capacity to manage larger volumes
of aid (Booth, 2011). The inter-linked aid
modalities thus range from conditional or
ear-marked financial support to a particular
sector such as education or health (in a so-called
Sector-WideApproach,orp)touncondition-
al financial support for a recipient government’s
budget (General Budget Support, or )
(Koeberle et al., 2006).
In Oceania these changes were adopted and
quickly began to reshape aid in the region.
Though often seen as small and remote from the
centres of the global aid industry ¢ focused on
sub-Saharan Africa or the Iraq/Afghanistan
military interventions ¢ the Pacific region was
not isolated from global geopolitics. Firstly, the
bombings in Bali in 2002 provided a stark remin-
der to Australia in particular that terrorism and
political instability could affect its own citizens
and its own strategic interests very close to home.
Furthermore, the civil conflict in the Solomon
Islands in the early 2000s, coups in Fiji, and
instability in Papua New Guinea helped create
an impression of an ‘arc of instability’ in the
south-western Pacific that could pose a distinct
and direct security threat to Australia, New Zea-
land and other countries in the region (Fry,
1997). To a large extent this concept of an arc of
instability was constructed as a means of sha-
ping Australia’s foreign and defence policies
rather than constituting a real and imminent
threat to the security of these metropolitan
countries (Dobell, 2007). The attention of these
countries ¢ along with , Japan, France,
Britain and the European Union ¢ turned more
to a region that had been relatively neglected in
the early post-Cold War years. There was a
degree of direct military engagement ¢ as with
the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon
Islands () initiative after 2003 ¢ but it was
development aid that was seen as the central
instrument in helping to build state capacity,
economic growth and social cohesion (Dinnen,
2004; Dinnen and Firth, 2008; Tabutaulaka,
2005).
Although the security concerns may have been
uppermost in the minds of several donors, the
poverty agenda nonetheless seemed to take an
equally prominent place in the aid landscape
(Storey et al, 2005). There were some protesta-
tions that poverty did not exist in the Pacific, at
least not in the same sense as the grinding
poverty and hunger in evidence elsewhere. Even
so, marked poverty and inequality do exist in the
Pacific. For example, in one of the comparatively
richer per capita territories ¢ French Polynesia ¢
a strong inequality between various segments of
the population results in the juxtaposition of the
genuinely poor and substantially rich (Herrera
and Merceron, 2010). Against this background,
but as much driven by the global consensus to
address the s, these poverty reduction goals
were rolled out across the region helping to
identify key sectors of concern and both donor
agencies and recipient governments began to
design and implement some major programmes,
especially in the health and education sectors
(Naidu and Wood, 2008; Naidu, 2009; Kidu,
2009; Feeny and Clarke, 2008). It was perhaps no
coincidence that the s and the poverty
agenda helped pinpoint the location of areas
of concern for aid ¢ Papua New Guinea, the
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Kiribati ¢ that
largely coincided with the security-driven arc of
instability concerns. Chand’s (2011) analysis
of Australian aid shows that poverty is only a
significant factor in the distribution of that
country’s aid after it has chosen recipients on
seemingly geopolitical grounds.
A snapshot of development aid to the Pacific
region in 2009 reveals some interesting insights
into the way this new aid regime developed.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of total
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F 1. ¢ Official Development Assistance to Pacific Island Countries 2009 (US $ millions) (Source: Data extracted from
http://stats.oecd.org/ in July 2011)
development aid ()1 to the region in an abso-
lute sense. Three points are apparent from this
map. Firstly, Melanesian states and territories,
particularly Papua New Guinea and the Solo-
mon Islands, dominate the allocation in terms of
total volume. This suggests that a combination
of the poverty agenda and security concerns
have been the main factors in determining aid
flows. Secondly, and a little more opaque, is the
way most recipient countries are dominated by a
single donor and this ‘patron’ is usually defined
by a former colonial status. Thus Australia
dominates in , France in the French territo-
ries of Wallis and Futuna (also French Polynesia
and New Caledonia, though these are not inclu-
ded in these data, just as Rapa Nui is excluded
being a province of Chile, and Hawai’i as a state
in ), the  in Micronesia and New Zealand
in Niue, the Cook Islands and the Tokelau
Islands. Furthermore, when it is remembered
that Britain largely disengaged from the region
following the independence of its former territo-
ries Fiji, the Solomon Islands and (partly)
Vanuatu ¢ to be largely replaced by Australia ¢
the neo-colonial drawing of the aid map beco-
mes even more stark. Indeed the only major
non-colonial players in the Pacific aid landscape
are Japan which significant in Kiribati, Fiji,
Tonga and Tuvalu, and China (and Taiwan), to
which we will turn shortly. The third feature is
that the major aid recipients in an absolute sense,
especially those in Melanesia (, the Solomon
Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji) are all sovereign inde-
pendent states. This is also the case for other
significant recipients: Samoa, Kiribati and
Tonga.
A second snapshot of aid in the region ¢ this
time based on aid per capita (Figure 2) ¢ reveals
a rather different landscape. Here we see not the
dominance of the Melanesian states ¢ Papua
New Guinea indeed has the lowest per capita
receipts ¢ but rather it is the small states, espe-
cially in Polynesia and Micronesia that are the
major recipients. Some of these ¢ Wallis and
Futuna, Tokelau, Niue ¢ have amongst the
highest per capita aid levels in the world. Clearly
1. These data, from the , only include financial flows captured by the  definition of aid (so-called ‘-able’ aid).
They exclude aid from China and other countries not party to  and also, as we shall see, significant flows of funds from
metropolitan governments (France and the  in particular) to Pacific territories and dependencies. Hawai’i and Rapa Nui
(Easter Island) are excluded also as they are deemed to be an integral part of  and Chile respectively.
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F 2. ¢ Per Capita Official Development Assistance to Pacific Island Countries 2009 (US $) (Source: Data extracted from
http://stats.oecd.org/ in July 2011)
neither poverty alleviation nor security concerns
are driving these very high levels of aid, for these
states are politically stable and have relatively
very favourable welfare indices. Instead it
appears that they are favoured because they are
not independent sovereign states but rather,
variously constituted dependencies and semi-
independent states whose close relationships to
the metropolitan patron secures them very high
levels of support, together with a very high level
of dependence on a single donor (Bertram,
2006).
Thus, when we look at this broader context of
development aid in the Pacific, we can begin to
ask some important questions and start to ques-
tion the frameworks and definitions we employ.
Firstly, a simple transfer of the global aid regime
to the Pacific ¢ one shaped by the s, the Paris
Declaration and the securitisation of aid ¢ does
not help us explain the complexities that are
apparent with even an elementary examination
of absolute or relative (per capita) aid flows.
Secondly, reliance on  aid data and defini-
tions, whilst important for standardising aid
statistics, masks what we suspect are more varied
and complex flows of resources and from a wider
range of donors ¢ something we turn to below.
Finally, our conventional frameworks for analy-
sing the region ¢ whether based on the cultural
Melanesia/Polynesia/Micronesia categories; the
French/American/British/Australasian (neo-)
colonial spheres of influence; or the environmen-
tal large/small islands framework ¢ do not serve
us well. There are clearly interesting commona-
lities across the divides, particularly if we
broaden our understanding of ‘aid’, but equally
important and more opaque contrasts. It is to
these complexities and possibilities that we now
turn.
What is Aid?
The definition and measurement of aid by the
 ¢ and indeed the very concept of aid ¢
needs to be critically questioned in relation to the
Pacific region. The maps above gave two views of
aid in the region but, as already suggested, these
are an inadequate and misleading portrayal of
the ways resources flow between Pacific Islands
and metropolitan states.
We have seen how patron donor states ¢
usually former colonial powers ¢ dominate the
aid receipts of several Pacific countries. Depen-
dence on these patrons leads to higher volumes
of aid and other benefits but it also involves
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greater reliance on and, potentially, control by,
the metropole. In these highly dependent Pacific
states, aid helps support the daily operation of
the state, either directly or because aid can be
fungible. For example in this latter case, aid
for education through scholarships to attend
universities overseas can free up recipient state
resources to spend in other areas of education.
Aid can support state functions at a higher level
than local revenue sources could sustain and
welfare services (and provision of health and
education) provided by the state can be signifi-
cant, compared to low-aid states. This can be
seen in highly aid-dependent states such as Toke-
lau or Niue. But, how do we define and measure
‘aid’ in territories that are highly or wholly inte-
grated with their metropole? At its most extreme,
we might point to the case of Hawai’i, one of the
states of , fully integrated into that country
but still a ‘Pacific Island state’. The same could
be said of Rapa Nui (Easter Island), a Pacific
Island that is fully integrated within Chile.
Neither Hawai’i nor Rapa Nui receive ‘aid’,
though one suspects that there are significant
flows of resources from the mainland that are
intended for what we might broadly define as
‘development’ purposes. In the case of Hawai’i it
is likely that net government financial flows are
positively skewed towards Hawai’i but for Rapa
Nui, there may be a negative flow, at least when
combined with private flows2.
U territories in the Pacific other than Hawai’i
have various constitutional arrangements that
link them to . American Samoa, for example
has been an integrated territory of the  since
1900 but it has its own constitution and its citi-
zens are classified as  nationals but not citi-
zens. The territory elects its own legislature but
does not vote in federal elections nor pay federal
taxes. It does not receive aid () from USA
though it does receive federal grants to support
government of the territory to the tune of $US
102 million ¢ out of total government spending
of $ 179 million (in 2007 ¢ USA Office of Insular
Affairs, 2011). Though not called ‘aid’ this finan-
cial flow is significant and equivalent to 21 per-
cent of the territory’s . Added to this direct
grant from USA, we need to consider a range of
other net financial flows such as that of the
military, direct payment of federal employees,
and some expenditure by federal departments
operating in the territory. These all constitute a
highly significant inflow of money that support
employment and services and material standards
of living well above what they would be without
such processes3. Elsewhere in the Pacific, we
might see similar disguised ‘aid’ flows to Guam
and perhaps the Northern Mariana Islands.
While other former territories such as Palau and
the Marshall Islands do receive  from the
USA that is captured by the , there is likely
to be additional expenditure that is not.
The French territories of the Pacific have simi-
lar characteristics to the US territories in this
regard.Againthere isadiversityof constitutional
arrangements that bind them to metropolitan
France and only a fraction of the financial flows
are counted as ‘aid’ according to the -
conventions. Wallis and Futuna is considered
sovereign; French aid to the country is reco-
gnised as . Indeed these flows are the highest
on a per capita basis in the region. The flows
support the operation of government and wel-
fare provision but are unlikely to be the only
financial flows that come from the metropole. In
fact, the people from Wallis have emigrated in
large numbers to New Caledonia in successive
‘waves’ since the 1950s, pushed by poverty at
home and pulled by jobs in the mining industry
overseas (Baudchon and Rallu, 1999; Nedelec,
2010). While this formally constitutes merely
‘moving residence within a country’, the pertai-
ning revenue streams are classic  features
(sea below).
The two largest French territories in the
region, New Caledonia and French Polynesia,
present an unusual and interesting examples of
the inadequacies of definitions and measure-
ment of aid. Figures 1 and 2 above reveal no
official aid flows into these two territories in
2009. Not recognised, for instance, are the
resources flowing to the two countries/territories
under the banner of the French Development
Agency (). At first, this lack of aid is not
surprising: both have very high per capita inco-
mes and their health and education services are
very well-funded. The mining and tourism
industries provide endogenous forms of income.
However, such a picture is highly misleading.
The residents of the two territories are French
2. Understanding net financial flows in this regard in Rapa Nui represents a gap in the literature and a challenge for research.
Rapa Nui is a province in Chile’s Region of Valparaíso Region IV and revenues flow inwards from national and regional
government for infrastructure, services and other provincial functions. There are also significant flows that arrive through the
national government’s development arm  as well as other aligned state arms. It is believed that significant revenues flow
out from tourism and rents to pay for education of Rapa Nui in the Chilean mainland. However, this potential inverse 
effect (see below) is based on anecdotal reflection only at this stage.
3. Material standards here refer to monetary income. These inflows may have broader negative impacts including unequal
distributional impacts and negative nutritional impacts that may detract from living standards more broadly defined.
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citizens, vote in metropolitan as well as local
elections and are free to move between the terri-
tory and metropolitan France. Even an almost
cursory glance at the flow of resources from the
French Treasury to these territories, reveals the
enormous significance of metropolitan aid to
the Pacific territories, even if it is formally pre-
sented ¢ or rather conveniently obscured ¢ as
‘intra-state’ transfers.
In New Caledonia, for example, the overall
contribution of metropolitan resources to the
total  is estimated to be about 18.5 %, or 1.14
billion euros per year (Hadj et al., 2011: 5). These
transfers mostly come in three ways, each bene-
fitting a particular segment of society in New
Caledonia. First, metropolitan resources come
to New Caledonia in the form of salaries, pen-
sions and associated costs for civil servants
amounting to an estimated 1.08 billion euros a
year. Second, metropolitan France contributes
about 80 million euros a year in ‘development
contracts’ for local projects negotiated indivi-
dually between Paris and various administrative
actors such as the government of New Caledo-
nia, the three provincial governments and
the 33 municipalities (‘communes’). And finally,
resources flow from Paris to New Caledonia in
the form of various and negotiable tax exemp-
tions for French businesses that invest or trade in
New Caledonia. The number of eligible projects
varies significantly from year to year, but tax
exemptions can run into hundreds of millions of
euros a year (Institut d’Émission de l’Outre-Mer
(, 2011: 53-54, 65).
Although these flows to the French territories
are not recorded as aid, even in part, this has not
always been the case. Figure 3 shows the histori-
cal flows of aid, as measured by the  to the
French Pacific territories. We can see that aid to
New Caledonia and French Polynesia rose stea-
dily from the mid 1960s so that they became the
two highest aid recipients in absolute terms in
the region for a brief period in the late 1990s. We
would have had no difficulty in classifying these
two places at that time as aid dependent econo-
mies. In 2000 the volumes fell to zero. This dra-
matic change came not because aid stopped but
because it was reclassified. The flows from Paris
to the Pacific were no longer seen as ‘aid’ but as a
French grant to support the operation of
government and the provision of services. A
change in definition did not stop the flows of
resources ¢ they have gone on increasing since ¢
yet we do not analyse them as aid. But we do use
the aid lens to examine what New Zealand, for
example, sends to what some term its ‘realm’
territories in Niue, the Tokelau Islands and
Cook Islands. These, we would argue, should be
seen in a very similar way to the French and US
flows and relationships. Indeed, some in govern-
mental circles in New Zealand have suggested
that such aid to its ‘realm’ territories should be
expanded so that they receive a level of govern-
ment services equivalent to a suburb in New
Zealand:
«the services New Zealand funds for its three Realm
territories are, in essence, services to New Zealand
citizens who happen to live in isolated places over-
seas.» (New Zealand House of Representatives, 2010:
30)
F 3. ¢ Official Development Assistance to French Pacific Territories 1966-2009 (US $ millions, constant prices) (Source:
Data extracted from http://stats.oecd.org/ in July 2011)
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These examples of the , French and New
Zealand territories in the Pacific should alert us
to the dangers of conventional analyses of aid.
Arbitrary constitutional arrangements and
changes in accounting definitions have distorted
our view of the ways Pacific states are linked
to their metropolitan patrons. ‘Aid’ comes in
many different forms but flows from the core
to the periphery to support government services
are not all recognised as aid as the  might
define it.
Furthermore, in terms of development in the
Pacific, aid is only a partial contributor to overall
welfare albeit one that can be highly significant
in certain contexts. In the mid 1980s Bertram
and Watters suggested that several Pacific Island
countries could be classified as  states (Ber-
tram and Watters, 1985; Bertram, 2004; 2006),
that is that their economies were dominated by
migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy.
These small states, with few natural resources
and no economies of scale had bleak prospects
for autonomous growth in an increasingly glo-
balised economy. What helped them function
effectively was in fact dependence on their
patrons ¢ trading independence for metropolitan
support allowed them to maintain relatively high
standards of living and open more options for
their citizens. Aid was an important component
of the  model, but of arguably greater
significance was increased labour mobility, a
result of the citizenship rights enjoyed by these
Pacific communities that gave them easy entry to
live and work in metropolitan countries and
remit money home to support their families,
churches, communities and businesses. Such
remittances have become vital components of
many Pacific economies. And they are found not
only in dependent states. Some independent sta-
tes such as Samoa can exploit historical ties and
agreements (in this case with New Zealand) to
secure preferential migration access, whilst for
Fiji, demand for its nurses and soldiers overseas
has opened opportunities for work abroad so
that remittances now rank close to tourism and
sugar as contributors its economy. Hau’ofa and
others have rejected the  model because of
its negative and patronising connotations and
argued that it was the Oceanic approach to deve-
lopment ¢ with Pacific Islanders adept at moving
and exploiting resources worldwide ¢ that was a
much more viable and positive model (Hau’ofa,
1995). Perhaps the divide between Hau’ofa’s
‘Oceanic’ approach and the  model may
not be as wide as first seems if we recognise the
importance of Pacific agency, initiative and
opportunism rather than apparent helplessness
in the face of external forces.
Migration and remittances may not seem to fit
well within an aid discourse, but they do consti-
tute important two-way flows of human and
capital resources. New Zealand and Australia
have recognised the development benefits of just
such an approach. New Zealand first, and
recently Australia, have instituted schemes to
allow workers from the Pacific to engage in
seasonal work on farms. This short term migra-
tion is sanctioned, organised and encouraged,
with strong backing from the Pacific govern-
ments, as a means to earn income overseas that
can be taken home to support both consumption
and investment.
Formally organised as well as spontenous
individual migration from Pacific Islands to
metropolitan countries like New Zealand also
expand and deepen the personal networks
between the two. Samoans, Tongans, Cook
Islanders, Niueans and Tokelauans now consti-
tute nearly 7 % of New Zealand’s population.
As such, they have not only become part and
parcel of New Zealand’s identity, but also begin
to hold important political levers in New Zea-
land. Arguably, recent shifts in New Zealand’s
aid policies away from Pacific Islands with high
poverty indices such as Papua New Guinea and
the Solomon Islands and towards Pacific Islands
with far better human development indices ¢
such as Samoa and Tonga ¢ are also driven by a
government’s desire to court the Samoan and
Tongan vote in the New Zealand electorate4.
In addition to migration and remittances, ana-
lyses of aid in the Pacific should also consider
trade. In the late 1980s, Taylor edited a collection
of research papers on Fiji and concluded that
European Union trade preferences for Fiji sugar
under the then Lomé Convention amounted to
‘aid with dignity’ (Taylor, 1987). By paying sta-
ble and higher-than-market prices for Fiji sugar,
Europe supported a large and thriving industry
in Fiji with significant flow-on effects to employ-
ment, transport, processing and services. It was a
form of support that significantly exceeded the
benefit to the Fijian economy derived directly
from official aid. Later the approach to trade
preferences as a form of aid was extended to
encompass the Australian and New Zealand
markets under the  agreement and, for
a while, a thriving garment industry flourished in
4. The use of votes as a local resource that flows from rural areas to the more powerful metropolitan capital cities in exchange
for material resources flowing from the metropolis to the peripheral areas is a common dynamic in an African context, see
Prinsen (2011).
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Fiji (Storey, 2004). This form of aid, though, is
sharply on the wane. Global trade liberalisation
has not only blunted the chances of Pacific coun-
tries gaining revenue from import tariffs but also
lowered the trade preferences they enjoyed under
 and Lomé to the point where the Fiji
garment has all but collapsed and the sugar
industry is suffering and contracting.
As well as recognising these forms of non-
financial aid through trade or migration conces-
sions, our view of aid in the Pacific needs to be
further expanded by recognising the activities of
non  aid donors, particularly China. The
activities of the Republic of China have become
much more visible in the Pacific in the past
decade, as they have in other parts of the world
(Mawdsley, 2010; Mohan and Power, 2009).
China is not a party to the , nor is it a
signatory of the Paris Declaration and the
amount that it spends on aid, and under what
conditions, remains shrouded (Hanson, 2008). It
is often regarded with suspicion and even deri-
sion by other aid donors for the way it operates
outside of the accepted () ‘rules’, seeming to
use aid as a way of leveraging political support
and of persuading recipients not to recognise the
independent status of Taiwan. Although it is
very difficult to measure the volume and direc-
tion of Chinese aid in the Pacific, its imprint is
clear to see (Ratuva, 2011). It has been active in
supporting infrastructure development and
public works. It has been particularly active in
building sports facilities and government buil-
dings (as in Fiji and Samoa) and throughout the
region Chinese companies are found construc-
ting roads and bridges in remote rural areas,
engaged in infrastructure projects that both
other donors and local governments shun
(though the latter are keen to see built). The
modus operandi of Chinese aid seems to be to
offer soft loans to recipients (the amount of the
concession providing the ‘aid’) which are then
used to employ Chinese contractors to directly
construct the roads and buildings. This is aid,
then, that is tied to Chinese suppliers and has a
clear return to the Chinese economy and it does
require recipients to repay their loans. It may
not align with international practice in aid, as
proscribed by the Paris Declaration and other
agreements, but Pacific states have been keen to
accept such assistance, especially as it has been in
areas which other donors have been reluctant to
engage in and it is often quicker and easier
to access with lower transaction costs.
We have seen from this brief overview, then,
that aid in the Pacific is a much more complex
phenomenon than that simply defined by
recorded flows of . The  apparatus
significantly underestimates flows of total aid,
whether by not including non-  donors such
as China, or by not counting flows to dependent
incorporated territories such as American
Samoa or New Caledonia. And it is completely
blind to important non-financial flows of assis-
tance. As we expand our frames of reference to
incorporate such flows, however, our concept of
aid begins to broaden and weaken. Aid is no
longer merely a one-way flow of funding from
donors to recipients to alleviate poverty. It is
instead, perhaps, a device to encapsulate the dif-
ferent ways in which wealthier countries seek to
exert influence over both the development stra-
tegies and political and social order of countries
in the Pacific. Simultaneously, aid in its diverse
forms may also be an instrument for Pacific peo-
ple to negotiate or direct the flow of resources
from and towards them. In this, the relationship
between countries and their underlying political
status and autonomy is critical.
What is Sovereignty?
The global aid regime is mainly predicated on
state to state transfers, from aid donor states to
sovereign recipient states. The ownership princi-
ple of the Paris Declaration strongly reinforces
this view: it is recipient governments who receive
and disburse aid supposedly as independent
entities able to determine their own development
strategies and priorities. In this context, ‘soverei-
gnty’ in Western-style democracies refers to poli-
tically independent entities exercising various
practices of sovereignty including upholding
fixed geographic borders and determining who
can reside within them, governing citizens via
domestically approved policies, enforcing law
and order via domestically controlled public for-
ces, controlling a national currency or proxy
thereof, and cooperating with other nation states
through, for example, pursuing international
treaties and bodies. In the Pacific region howe-
ver, this commonly-held view of sovereignty is
not sufficient. We require a broader and more
flexible concept in order to capture the effective
exercise of self-determination in the region
(Wesley Smith, 2007).
In Oceania, sovereignty is not a simple issue:
there is no straightforward divide between fully
independent nation-states and territories inte-
grated into other nation-states. There is a wide
range of constitutional arrangements that define
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linkages between Pacific territories5 and their
patrons. At one end of the scale are fully sove-
reign territories that constitute nation states,
such as Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Tonga or
Fiji, though even here the dominance of a major
donor (as with Australia in ) means that the
degree of influence held in practice by one
metropolitan power does constrain some aspects
of effective sovereignty. At the other end of the
scale are territories (Hawai’i, Rapa Nui, etc) that
are fully integrated into other independent
nation-states. In this light, one might even argue
that New Zealand is a Pacific Island state that
has fully integrated the polities of its indigenous
Polynesian (Maori) population often against the
will and rights of the latter. In between these is
an array of territories that are nominally inde-
pendent but have one or more aspects of their
sovereignty negotiated in a special relationship
with their patron. There are, for example, the
Cook Islands and Niue: two territories which are
‘self governing’ but ‘in free association’ with
New Zealand such that its citizens have most of
the rights of New Zealand citizens and, if
requested, New Zealand may take on some sove-
reign obligations, such as defence. Samoa has a
Treaty of Friendship with New Zealand recogni-
sing a former colonial relationship that has pro-
vided some special concessions for independent
Samoa. The Marshall Islands has a compact
with the  that also gives it special status and
support and we have noted the semi-integrated
status of American Samoa. New Caledonia is
part of France but is in an evolutionary process
that opens the possibility of a transition to
independence, a situation different to other
integrated French territories.
As well as there being a range of degrees of
sovereignty across the region, it appears that
various constituent aspects of sovereignty itself
appear to have political and strategic value that
can be traded and exploited. Even small states
can use aspects of their sovereign status to leve-
rage benefits. A seat at the United Nations or
international agencies, such as the International
Whaling Commission, comes with a vote and a
vote that may be sought (and even bought) by
larger and wealthier countries. Whilst full inde-
pendence may thus seem to provide bargaining
power and potential for gain, the  model
suggests that it is not full sovereignty but a nego-
tiated, fluid, and evolving dependence that yields
benefits from the metropole. Aid volumes are
greater and opportunities for migration greatly
increased when countries retain a close link to
their patron. Sovereignty in the Pacific thus is a
malleable concept and its constituent elements
are a negotiable commodity. There is value in
asserting independence but equally there is some
worth in trading aspects of effective sovereignty
for increased levels of support. This is the first
part of what we term the ‘inverse sovereignty
effect’ in the Pacific: higher levels of sovereignty
are inversely related to material standards of
living and opportunities for aid and remittances.
Yet to confine analysis of sovereignty in the
Pacific simply to territorial political status mis-
ses an opportunity to explore deeper meanings
of the term. Here we turn to political debates
within Aotearoa/New Zealand. This nation-
state was founded by a treaty between the British
Crown and its various (Maori) indigenous poli-
ties ¢ the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840. The Treaty
has been a source of contention between Maori
and the later arrivals (pakeha) to the nation-
state. The Treaty contained an agreement that
the British Crown would protect Maori soverei-
gnty (tino rangatiratanga)6 and use of their land
and resources, as well as offering full participa-
tion as British subjects and partnership in gover-
ning the nation-state. Over the years the Treaty
was often neglected, ignored and not effectively
passed into law. In the past 30 years however it
has been revived in the country’s political dis-
course and become a means for Maori to make
claims against the nation state, or the Crown, for
abuses of the Treaty, particularly over the loss of
their land and resources. One of the central fea-
tures of this revival has been the debate about
Maori sovereignty. For some pakeha this has
caused alarm that it might precipitate some form
of separate government for Maori or even com-
plete Maori control over the ‘sovereignty’ of the
nation-state. Yet, at essence is the question of
sovereignty as ‘self-determination’: the right
of Maori to have control over their own develo-
pment and, in particular, control over their own
lands, customs and treasures and the right to
(re-) negotiate aspects of this sovereignty, even if
this lies within the geographical boundaries of
the nation-state of New Zealand. This is
obviously a highly contentious and politically
charged debate but it does open up the possi-
bility of seeing sovereignty in a much more
5. Here we use the term ‘territory’ to include all polities that exist in Oceania including independent nation states, countries
in free association, integrated territories and so on.
6. There has been confusion over the Treaty as result of translations between English and Maori. The English version of the
Treaty used ‘sovereignty’ to denote cession of absolute power to the British Crown. In the Maori version of the Treaty the term
tino rangatiratanga was used and taken to mean continued Maori use and control over their resources.
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practical and less legalistic sense, namely how
self-determination is exercised and performed
on a day-to-day basis by individuals and
communities that co-exist.
We suggest this more complex and nuanced
understanding of sovereignty is important for
how we see aid in the Pacific and how we unravel
and analyse the relationships between Pacific
peoples, communities, nations and states and
their metropolitan ‘partners’ and/or patrons.
Here we need to explore how aid ¢ in all its
complex forms ¢ is negotiated, implemented,
monitored and evaluated. In this we draw on
the preliminary research of Wrighton (2010;
Wrighton and Overton, 2012) on aid in Tuvalu.
Wrighton suggests that the practice of aid in
Tuvalu is rather different from, and sometimes
contradictory to, the rhetoric of the Paris Decla-
ration and its support for recipient ownership. In
Tuvalu, with its small population and small,
overstretched local bureaucracy, the require-
ments of donors to comply with the plethora of
their financial management systems, audits,
consultative mechanisms, plans and so on, place
a very high burden on the few officials who have
to implement the nation state’s administration
and development. A wide range of donors ¢
bilateral partners such as Australia, Japan and
New Zealand, multilateral agencies, and regio-
nal organisations - seek to meet, discuss, co-
ordinate, align and manage a long list of pro-
grammes and projects with a handful of local
officials. Ostensibly then, the Paris Declaration
principles of ‘alignment’ and ‘managing for
results’ are adhered to and the key principle of
‘ownership’ is respected by donors in the holding
of frequent meetings and consultations. In reality
the actual practice is that donor harmonisation
is very poorly achieved and the substance of the
ownership is effectively undermined by the com-
plexity and magnitude of donor requirements,
or ¢ alternatively ¢ effectively traded by the aid
recipient. We regard this as a second element of
the inverse sovereignty effect: the new aid regime,
despite the rhetoric of country ownership, is
actually diminishing the ability of recipient
governments and communities to exercise self-
determination because of the burden of com-
pliance and the new process-conditionalities of
aid (Murray and Overton, 2011b; Gould, 2005).
Therefore, it is argued here that we need to
take a much more geographically detailed and
more critical view of sovereignty in Oceania.
Sovereignty is neither simple nor absolute. It is
about the political and legal status of a territory
but also critically about the ability of those
involved in governance and administration to
exercise effective control over their own develo-
pment and their own resources. Sovereignty, as
we define it, is multi-dimensional and heteroge-
neous, it is flexible and malleable and it is conti-
nually contested and negotiated at a local scale
through everyday interactions that contain both
overt and subtle performances of power. Aid lies
at the centre of many of these dialectical perfor-
mances, simultaneously espousing local sover-
eignty, whilst acting to undermine it.
The Inverse Sovereignty Effect: A Research
Agenda
The above framing of aid and sovereignty in
Oceania provides the context for a research
project being carried out through Victoria Uni-
versity of Wellington and the University of the
South Pacific that is supported by the Marsden
Fund in New Zealand. A three year project run-
ning from 2011 to 2013, it examines the way the
global aid regime of the past decade and its
associated modalities have been put into practice
in the Pacific region. Its central hypothesis is the
inverse sovereignty effect noted above: how at
one level state sovereignty seems to be inversely
related to development and welfare; and, cru-
cially, at another, how the aid regime of the past
decade actually diminishes territorial self-
determination by placing unreasonable burdens
of compliance and consultation on small under-
resourced institutions.
The project builds on Wrighton’s research in
Tuvalu and explores further Pacific case studies
that add other dimensions to our understanding
by including territories of different size, political
status and past colonial affiliation. As well as the
Tuvalu work, the proposed core case studies will
include territories that have agreed to participate
and may include the Cook Islands, Kiribati, the
Marshall Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. Other
studies will examine related aspects of aid and
development in New Caledonia, Samoa, Solo-
mon Islands, Rapa Nui and Niue and a linked
project will examine the role of civil society in
promoting local self determination over aid. For
the core studies a set of markers of development
sovereignty will be used to measure the degree to
which local individuals and institutions have
exercised forms of control over aid negotiations
and implementation. Through an active pro-
gramme of participation by Pacific governments,
it is planned to develop a series of practical
recommendations that countries ¢ both reci-
pients and donors ¢ can use to help enhance
effective sovereignty and, thus development and
aid effectiveness.
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Initial findings from the research reveal a
diversity of experiences and practices across the
region. It is clear that the new aid regime has had
a significant impact in the way aid programmes
are negotiated and implemented. Administrative
burdens have increased and lack of capacity can
be identified in several areas. For some countries,
such as Tuvalu, the burden of consultation and
compliance is very high. Yet there are also ins-
tances where, within limits, local institutions and
individuals are able effectively to engage with
and use the principles of the agenda ¢ especially
the concepts of ownership and alignment ¢ to
assert a good degree of local control. In Samoa,
for example, a particularly confident and asser-
tive approach to the aid effectiveness agenda has
allowed officials to maintain and arguably
increase the opportunities for local development
sovereignty. It remains to be seen, however, what
the effect of relative political independence/
dependence is on this ability to leverage local
policy space.
Conclusions
This paper has outlined a research project on
aid in the Pacific. We argue that there is conside-
rable potential for this work to reshape our
understanding of aid and development not only
in Oceania but also globally. Within the Pacific
there is clearly a pressing need to question and
reconfigure our existing frames of reference for
aid. We argue that the / apparatus for
defining and measuring aid is but a partial and
inadequate mechanism. In the Pacific in particu-
lar it misses many flows that might justifiably be
termed ‘aid’: non financial instruments to do
with labour movement, remittances and trade;
the substantial flows of resources to territories
which are integrated in politically diverse ways to
their metropoles; and the operations of non-
 donors such as China. These are all of vital
importance in the region, and arguably more
apparent than in other aid receiving regions. If
we broaden our scope to include such forms of
aid, this leads us to question our very concept
of aid. This might move the work in the direction
of Severino’s (2011) suggestions regarding the
future of development assistance: aid as global
social policy and aid as a means to compensate
for the social and environmental externalities of
globalisation. Or it might take a more radical
post-development and postcolonial direction,
criticising aid as a tool of external control and
exploitation. Alternatively it might merely reveal
that aid is but one element in complex and multi-
layered relationships between territories. Aid is
rarely a matter of absolutes or clearly defined
mechanisms and flows but rather a complex set
of linkages, mutually constitutive flows, asym-
metrical power relationships and fluid political
assemblages.
Finally, we argue that we need to look at the
concept of sovereignty much more closely in
relation to aid. Sovereignty is about the exercise
of power and self-determination. As with aid,
our conventional frameworks and definitions of
sovereignty are limited and overly rigid thus obs-
curing a deeper understanding of how power is
exercised with and through aid. In this regard,
throughout this project it will be critical to adopt
a perspective on the region that recognises and
celebrates the potential for local agency. Too
often, critiques of aid commit the error of what
we term here scalar determinism ¢ that the glo-
bal overwhelms the local and thus structure
determines agency. Such critiques emphasise the
overwhelming power of donors and the global
aid ‘industry’ and, by implication, the weakness
and helplessness of recipients. This has been
illuminated by post-development theories which
point to the discourse of development which,
through the very use of terms such as ‘aid’,
‘recipient’, ‘donor’ and ‘progress’, posit a highly
unequal relationship, demarcate arenas where
power is exercised in only one direction, and
present ‘development’ and ‘aid’ as essentially
unproblematic and uncontestable concepts.
Indeed, such a project could easily succumb to
the simplistic view that donors hold all the
power, that small Pacific Island bureaucracies
are incapable of resistance and that all aid is
somehow malevolent; merely a tool for op-
pression and exploitation of the region. Yet the
challenge for the project is to find space for local
agency: to uncover strategies used by Pacific peo-
ple and institutions to resist, subvert, co-opt or
steer the aid regime in their own ways to help
promote their own effective sovereignty over
development. Doing so requires a more sophis-
ticated conceptualisation of the interaction
between process at different scales and the
relationship between structure and agency.
By sharing such knowledge and support
amongst Pacific territories and also by alerting
donors to the pressing need to recognise the
essence of ‘ownership’ we hope to contribute to
a reformed and more effective aid landscape in
the region. Furthermore, it is hoped that the
understandings to be gained from the Pacific
may have resonance more widely. We believe
there is considerable scope for Pacific perspec-
tives to challenge and contribute to evolving
240 SOCIÉTÉ DES OCÉANISTES
conceptions and practices of aid and soverei-
gnty. To close, we reiterate that aid in the Pacific
has not lived up to the rhetoric of local
ownership with effective practice but, despite its
profound shortcomings, we see potential for aid
to precipitate positive change. Such a reformed
aid landscape would facilitate Pacific peoples
and their institutions to regain and sustain
control over their land, resources and decision
making processes. This, in turn, would provide
opportunities to pursue what they themselves
define as desirable development strategies and
outcomes.
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